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Recent years have seen an increasing awareness on the part of all western na-
tions of the need to secure and maintain dependable sources of oil and natural gas
to meet the energy needs of industrial economies.1  In those countries without
domestic supplies, attention is focused upon methods of insuring a steady flow of
imported oil and gas. Those countries with domestic supplies have been faced
with the different (and in some cases additional) problem of determining how best
to manage and control those supplies.
Two countries facing this latter problem are the United States and Canada.
Of particular concern has been the issue of whether control of domestic oil and gas
development should be centered at the local or national level. In recent years,
Canada's oil-rich western provinces have been actively advocating increased pro-
vincial authority and a concomitant decrease in federal power. 2 Concurrently, the
oil and gas producing states in the United States have sought greater control over
their energy resources. 3 While in both countries the national government has paid
lip service to a continued role for local government, policy pronouncements clearly
indicate a climate of continued confrontation. 4 Each country must deal with this
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1. Oil and natural gas provide more than three-fourths of all energy consumed in the United States.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS CLEARINGHOUSE, ENERGY: A GUIDE TO ORGANIZATIONS AND INFORMATION RE-
SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (2d ed. 1978).
2. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Sept.22, 1980, at 42; N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1981, § 1, at 8. Indeed some separa-
tist sentiment has cropped up among Albertans and other western Canadians. After the National Energy
Program was announced on October 28, 1980, support for the separatists increased dramatically. See gener-
ally, Ralph Hedlin Assoc., Western Canada in Confederation, II D.M.T. MONTHLY NEWSLETTER, Report 6, at
5-9 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Callison, The Great Sagebrush Rally, 83 NAT'L AUDOBON SOC'Y 113 (1981); Conely, The Rape
of the West, 167 OUTDOOR LIFE 4 (1981); Trueblood, The Sagebrush ROoff, 85 FIELD & STREAM 32 (1981).
4. In 1974, the Federal-Provincial Energy Conference was convened in Canada after the enactment of
a flurry of federal and provincial legislation relating to energy resources. For a chart depicting the legisla-
tion enacted during this period, see Harrison, Natural Resources and the Constitution: Some Recent Developments
and Their Implicatizons for the Future Regulation of Resource Industries, 18 ALTA L. REV. 1, 4 (1980). The Cana-
dian Prime Minister remarked during the Conference that "[wihile the federal government recognizes the
legitimate interests of both provincial governments and private companies, we are determined to safeguard
the interests of the consumers of Canada." OPENING STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA
AT THE FIRST MINISTERS' CONFERENCE ON ENERGY, Ottawa, Jan. 22, 1974, Conf. Doc. No. FP-4127, as
quoted in Harrison, at 4.
While one commentator noted that former President Carter "impliedly recognized the importance of
the gas producing states' roles in regulating new gas, thereby returning to the States a portion of the power
that, arguably, had been taken away from them by the Phillips decision," Richard, Appeal)fom Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce: The State Role Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 41 LA. L. REv. 147, 152 (1980), his
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confrontation within a different constitutional framework. This note will set forth
these differing frameworks, and discuss the impact of specific provisions upon the
natural resources confrontation. 5 In particular, the constitutional weapons of each
side will be enumerated. It should be noted, however, that policy considerations
National Energy Plan called for legislation to do away with the "[alrtificial distinction between interstate
and intrastate markets." THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY
POLICY AND PLANNING 52 (1977). Indeed, under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3432 (NGPA) federal price controls were extended to the intrastate market. Seegenerally, Comment, For Gas
Congress Spells Relief N-C-P-A: An Analysis of the Natural Gas Polic Act of 1978, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 429
(1979).
5. The Canadian constitutional provisions herein discussed are amended to some extent by the pro-
posed constitutional resolution currently being debated in Canada. These amendments, if enacted, would
obviously alter this note's discussion of Canadian constitutional law. See Part I infia. The text of the
amendments is as follows:
Non-Renewable Natural Resources Foresty Resources
and Electrial Ener
92A. (1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to
(a) exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province;
(b) development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and
forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary pro-
duction therefrom; and
(c) development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the
generation and production of electrical energy.
(2) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the export from the province to
another part of Canada of the primary production from non-renewable natural resources and
forestry resources in the province and the production from facilities in the province for the gener-
ation of electrical energy, but such laws may not authorize or provide for discrimination in prices
or in supplies exported to another part of Canada.
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) derogates from the authority of parliament to enact laws in relation to
the matters referred to in that subsection and, where such a law of Parliament and a law of a
province conflict, the law of Parliament prevails to the extent of the conflict.
(4) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the raising of money by any mode
or system of taxation in respect of
(a) non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and the primary pro-
duction therefrom, and
(b) sites and facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy and the production
therefrom,
whether or not such production is exported in whole or in part from the province, but such
laws may not authorize or provide for taxation that differentiates between production ex-
ported to another part of Canada and production not exported from the province.
(5) The expression "primary production" has the meaning assigned by the sixth schedule.
(6) Nothing in subsections (1) to (5) derogates from any powers or rights that a legislature or govern-
ment of a province had immediately before the coming into force of this section.
The Sixth Schedule
Prinaqy Production ftom Non-Renewable Natural Resources
and Forestry Resources
1. For the purposes of section 92A of this Act,
(a) production from non-renewable natural resource is primary production therefrom if
(i) it is in the form in which it exists upon its recovery or severance from its natural state, or
(ii) it is a product resulting from processing or refining the resource, and is not a manufactured
product or a product resulting from refining crude oil, refining upgraded heavey crude oil,
refining gases or liquids derived from coal or refining a synthetic equivalent of crude oil;
and
(b) production from a forestry resource is primary production therefrom if it consists of sawlogs,
poles, lumber, woodchips, sawdust or any other primary wood product, or wood pulp, and is
not a product manufactured from wood.
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having little to do with broad constitutional guidelines may ultimately decide the
issue.
I
THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DIVISION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENTS
The Canadian Constitution is embodied, for the most part, in the British
North America Act of 1867 (BNA Act). 6 The most important aspect of the BNA
Act is the distribution of lawmaking powers between federal and provincial gov-
ernments. 7 Canadian provincial legislatures are not subordinate to the federal
Parliament. Rather, they are considered coordinate lawmaking bodies. Thus, a
provincial legislature may pass legislation identical to that of Parliament. In case
of any incompatibility, the federal provision controls., Section 91 of the BNA Act
gives the federal Parliament the power to "make laws for the Peace, Order, and
good government of Canada,"9 and enumerates thirty-one specific powers as illus-
trations. 10 Section 92 provides that the provincial legislatures shall have exclusive
power to make laws regarding the sixteen subjects listed in that section.1 ' In addi-
tion, section 109 reserves jurisdiction over lands, mines, minerals and royalties to
the provinces. 1
2
A. Federal Authority to Legislate with Respect to Oil and Gas Resources
The peace, order and good government clause grants the federal government
the authority to act in a crisis.13 This clause is of primary importance in situations
6. The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter cited as BNA Act]. The
preamble of the BNA Act provides that the Constitution is to be similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom. Thus the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Act of Settlement and the Habeas Corpus
Act form part of the Canadian Constitution, as do British customs regarding the administration of govern-
ment. F. SUSSMAN, THE LAW IN CANADA 15 (1976). The BNA Act is not as broad and far-reaching as the
U.S. Constitution. For example, the BNA Act contains no corresponding Bill of Rights. SUSSMAN at 15.
7. SUSSMAN, supra note 6, at 15.
8. Matas, The EEC asa Moddfor Canada, 10 MAN. L. J. 259, 269 (1980). The doctrine of paramountcy
of federal legislation was clearly articulated in Reference Re Fisheries Act, 1914, 1 D.L.R. 194 (1930).
However, the fact that the provisions are concurrent is not in itself a cause for concern. Matas at 272-73.
9. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 91.
10. Id. This list of specific powers is not intended to be an exclusive list. Rather, it is meant to
illustrate examples of powers that are granted to the federal government under the peace, order and good
government clause. SUSSMAN, supra note 6, at 17. Some of the powers enumerated in § 91 include:
"(2) Regulation of Trade and Commerce; .. .(3) The raising of money by any Mode or System of Taxa-
tion."
11. BNA Act, supra note 6. Some of these powers in § 92 include: "(2) Direct Taxation within the
Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes; .. .(5) The Management and Sale
of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon; . . . (10) Local
Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following Classes: (a) Lines of Steam or other Ships,
Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other
or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the limits of the Province;. . . (c) Such works as, although
wholly situate within the Province, are before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of Ca-
nada to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of two or more of the Provinces;...
(16) Generally all matters of a merely local or private Nature in the province."
12. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 109.
13. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 91.
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which are not otherwise dealt with explicitly in either section 91 or section 92 of
the BNA Act. 14 It is well established that this clause operates during a time of
national emergency to grant Parliament the power to legislate with respect to sub-
jects of national concern or interest. ' 5 A recent case has indicated that Parliament
has broad discretion to find that an emergency exists. In Reference re Anti-Inflation
Act, 16 the Canadian supreme court accepted without analysis Parliament's judg-
ment that an emergency existed,17 thus relaxing the definition of emergency. 18 The
circumstances present in Reference re Anti-Injlation Act were substantially similar to
those existing in the present oil and gas situation, 19 and therefore the peace, order
and good government clause may provide a constitutional basis for a major in-
crease in federal control over Canada's energy resources. 20
The trade and commerce clause, which provides that "the exclusive Legislative
Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all matters coming
within. . .the Regulation of Trade and Commerce" applies to matters of inter-
provincial and international trade. 2' A broad view of the Dominion's trade and
commerce power was recently applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in Central
14. Munro v. Nat'l Capital Corp., 57 D.L.R.2d 753 (1966). ee general', Ballem, The Energy Cnwch and
Constitutional Reform 57 CAN B. REV. 740 (1979); See also, Ballem, Oil and Gas and the Canadin Constitution on
Land and Under the Sea, L. Soc'y OF UPPER CANADA, SPECIAL LECTURES 251, 252 (1978); Thring, Alberta,
Oil, and the Constitution, 17 ALTA. L. REV. 69, 90 (1979).
15. See, e.g., Toronto Elec. Comm'r v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 (P.C.) (Can.); Fort Frances Pulp and
Power Co. v. Man. Free Press Ltd., [1923] A.C. 695 (P.C.) (Can.); In re Board of Commerce Act, [1922]
A.C. 191 (P.C.) (Can.).
16. 68 D.L.R.3d 452 (1976).
17. Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, 68 D.L.R.3d at 497-98. See gSeralo5, Ballem, Eergv Crunch, supra
note 14, at 742; Ballem, Oil and Gas, supra note 14, at 253.
18. The Chief Justice pointed out that the economic crisis imperiled the well-being of the people of
Canada as a whole. 68 D.L.R. 3d at 492-97.
19. Ballem, Energv Crunch, supra note 14, at 742. While the court in Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act
noted the high rate of inflation in 1974-75, and accepted an economist's statement that "the problem of the
coexistence of high unemployment and high inflation rates was not . . . encountered before the late
1960s," the Court also noted that the economist answered the question "Could an economist say that the
Canadian economy faced an economic crisis, or was in a critical situation, in October 1975?" in the nega-
tive. 68 D.L.R.3d at 496-97. Thus, the economic situation was serious, but apparently not viewed as
critical by some economists. The court allowed Parliament's judgment that a crisis existed to stand, with-
out questioning it.
The oil and gas situation has, at times during the 1970s, been in as serious a state as the economic
situation, with rapidly increasing prices and a diminishing supply, even though an economist may be
reluctant to say that the situation has actually reached crisis proportions.
20. One author noted that:
[t]he tack taken by the Supreme Court in the Anti-.nftation Reference would permit Parliament to deal
with an imminent or existing energy crisis by such steps as the establishment of allocation and ration-
ing schemes, fixing prices, and other preventive or remedial measures. On the other hand, the crisis
would have to be real and apparent before existing provincial powers could be displaced.
Ballem, Energ
, 
Crunch, supra note 14, at 743. Ballem contends further that:
In the absence of any marked change in the present situation the federal government could not rely on
the Peace, Order and Good Government clause. Any radical steps by foreign host countries to reduce
Canada's supply of crude or increase its price could change this situation overnight.
Ballem, Oil and Gas, supra note 14, at 254. See aso, Thring, supra note 14, at 90. "[A]part from a critical
national emergency, it is highly unlikely that the courts would allow the expansion of the general powers in
matters clearly within section 92." Id
21. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 91(2). In addition, an early case held that the trade and commerce
power extends to the "general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion." Citizens Ins. Co. of
Canada v. Parsons, 7 App. Gas. 96 (P.C. 1881) (Can.).
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Canada Potash Co. v. Saskatchewan. 22 The government of Saskatchewan promul-
gated the Potash Conservation Regulations23 to control production and stabilize
the price of potash. 24 These regulations fixed a minimum selling price applicable
to permitted production quotas. The only market in which the schemes had any
significant effect, however, was the export market. Thus, when Central Canada
Potash brought an action challenging the validity of these regulations, they were
held to be an impermissible encroachment upon the federal government's trade
and commerce power.
With respect to energy resources, the trade and commerce power is the basis for
the exercise of federal authority over Canadian oil and gas exports, 25 as well as
over the interprovincial movement of oil and gas. 26 It is difficult for a province to
"legislate with respect to a commodity which is involved in a transaction taking
place at least partly outside the province, ' 27 particularly in light of the supreme
court's adoption of the "flow theory" of interprovincial trade. As articulated by
Chief Justice Kerash in Reference re The Farm Products Marketing Act, 28 "Once an
article enters into the flow of interprovincial or extraprovincial trade, the subject
matter and all its attendant circumstances ceases to be a mere matter of local
concern."
29
It is possible that federal legislative authority will be extended to include the
processing of oil and gas which is sold outside the producing province, since
processing is part of the flow of oil and gas in interprovincial trade.30 While the
22. 88 D.L.R.3d 609 (1978).
23. O.C. 1737/69, Sask. Reg. 287/69 as amended by O.C. 404/70, Sask. Reg. 64/70. These regulations
were passed under the authority of the Mineral Resources Act, SASK. REV. STAT. ch. 50 (1965).
24. In the Potash case, Chief Justice Laskin noted that the Saskatchewan government had not been
acting under proprietary right, but "in pursuance of legislative and statutory authority directed to the
proprietary rights of others." 88 D.L.R.3d, at 630 n.I. Thus, the case implies that different considerations
would come into play if Saskatchewan has asserted a proprietary right. The assumption is that a province
can control its public lands and resources as any private owner can do, but property rights of a province
don't immunize the province from federal laws enacted pursuant to the trade and commerce power. Bush-
nell, Constitutional Law-Arop eta y Rights and the Control of Natural Resources, 58 CAN. B. REV. 157, 158
(1980).
25. Ballem, Energv Crunch, supra note 14, at 743. In Caloil Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, 20 D.L.R.
3d 472 (1971), federal regulations that authorized the National Energy Board to restrict the sale of im-
ported gasoline to certain areas were upheld under the trade and commerce power.
26. Crommelin,Jurisdiction Over Onshore Oil and Gas in Canada, 10 U.B.C.L. REV. 86, 130 (1975). This
clause has generally been more successfully used to strike down provincial legislation than as a basis for
federal legislation. Thus, this clause is particularly important in the area of oil and gas legislation, since 80
percent of Alberta's and 98 percent of Saskatchewan's crude oil leaves the province for other parts of
Canada and the United States. Ballem, Oil and Gas, supra note 14, at 254.
27. Ballem, Oil and Gas, supra note 14, at 256. See generally, Crommelin, supra note 26, at 97-100. One
commentator compared the expansion of the trade and commerce power to the broad interpretation of the
commerce clause in the U.S. Constitution. Thring, supra note 14, at 89. For a discussion of the commerce
clause as it relates to oil and gas in the United States, see notes 59-62 infta and accompanying text.
28. 7 D.L.R.2d 257 (1957).
29. 7 D.L.R.2d at 265. This "flow of goods" notion was adopted by the court in Attorney Gen. of
Man. v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Ass'n, 19 D.L.R. 3d 169 (S.C.C. 1971), and in Attorney Gen. of Man.
v. Burns Foods, Ltd., 40 D.L.R.3d 731 (1975), where legislative schemes to protect domestic produce were
held to be primarily related to interprovincial trade, and thus reserved to the federal government under the
trade and commerce power. But see Carnation Co. v. Quebec Agri-Marketing Bd., 67 D.L.R.2d 1 (1968),
where the flow theory was disregarded.
30. Ballem, Oiland Gas, supra note 14, at 257. Cf. Crommelin, note 26, at 100; Bushnell, supra note 24,
at 168 (1980).
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trade and commerce power has not, to date, been extended that far, it is not un-
likely that the courts will continue to broaden the scope of this clause, basing the
interpretation on the "flow theory".
The taxing power provides the federal government with legislative authority to
raise money by any mode or system of taxation.3 1 This power is limited only by
section 125 of the BNA Act, which precludes the Dominion from imposing a tax
on provincial property. 32 An unusual interpretation of the limitation in section
125 was set forth in Attorney General of British Columbia v. Attorney General of Canada,33
where the Privy Council upheld a federal customs duty on goods imported into a
province for sale, even though the goods were provincial property. This decision
seems to be based on an interpretation of section 125 which subjects the prohibi-
tion of a tax on provincial property to all of the federal government's powers enu-
merated in section 91. 34 Since the challenged duty involved a regulation of trade
and commerce, expressly reserved to the federal government under section 91(2),
the duty was upheld even though it was a tax imposed on provincial property.35
The Privy Council's analysis in this case has not been applied to a case concerning
federal taxation of oil and gas belonging to the provinces, and it is doubtful that it
will be so extended. 36
The federal government's declaratory power provides an opportunity for uni-
lateral extension of federal jurisdiction. Under section 92(10)(c) of the BNA Act,
jurisdiction over "such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are
before or after their execution decided by the Parliament of Canada to be for the
general advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the Prov-
inces" is removed from the provinces. This section "confers upon Parliament an
extraordinary power to unilaterally enlarge its jurisdiction. '3 7 The judgment of
31. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 91(3).
32. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 125.
33. (Liquor Import case), [1924] A.C. 222 (P.C.)(Can.).
34. Id at 225.
35. As one author noted, "the case does not go so far as to say that all federal customs duties are
validly imposed. There remains the question whether the legislation levying the duties is in relation to a
matter coming within one of the classes of subjects in section 91." Crommelin, supra note 26, at 107.
Furthermore, courts have generally held that the federal government may not use the taxing power to
regulate indirectly where it may not regulate directly. See, e.g., In re Insurance Act of Canada, [1932] A.C.
41, 52 (P.C.)(Can.); Attorney Gen. of Canada v. Attorney Gen. of Ontario (Employment and Social Insurance
Reference) [1957] A.C. 355 (P.C.)(Can.).
36. "It may be doubted whether [this case] is correct in principle." Crommelin, supra note 26, at 108.
Thus, its precedential value is uncertain. The more pressing issue in the area of taxation of oil and gas
involves the scope of provincial taxing power. For a discussion of the provincial taxing power, see notes 55-
65 infira and accompanying text.
37. Ballem, Energy Crunch, supra note 14, at 745. The declaratory power is described in Reference re
Waters and Waters-Powers, 2 D.L.R. 481 (1929) as follows:
The authority created by s. 92(10(c) is of a most unusual nature. It is an authority given to the
Dominion Parliament to clothe itself with jurisdiction---exclusive jurisdiction-in respect of subjects
over which, in the absence of such action by Parliament, exclusive control is, and would remain,
vested in the provinces. Parliament is empowered to withdraw from that control matters coming
within such subjects and to assume jurisdiction itself. It wields an authority which enables it, in effect,
to rearrange the distribution of legislative powers effected directly by the Act, and, in some views of
the enactment, to bring about change of the most radical import, in that distribution.
Id at 220. As of 1977, there have been 470 such declarations made by Parliament. HOGG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW OF CANADA 330 (1977).
[Vol. 44: No. 3
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Parliament concerning "general advantage" or "advantage of two or more of the
provinces" cannot be questioned by the courts when such a declaration is made;
the only issue is whether the subject matter of the declaration is a "Work". 38 It is
a generally accepted propostion that oil and gas wells, oil sands plants and process-
ing plants are "Works". 39 This would enable Parliament to "declare such facilities
to be for the general advantage of Canada and thereby obtain a large measure of
control over the oil industry."'40 Until Parliament makes such a declaration in the
oil and gas field, however, the scope of Parliament's authority under section
92(10)(c) remains undefined.4 1
B. Provincial Legislative Authority with Regard to Oil and Gas
One source of provincial control of oil and gas resources is direct ownership. 42
Provincial government ownership, however, is restricted to those resources found
on public land held by the province. 43 The distribution of public land between
the federal government and the provinces is set forth in the BNA Act as well as in
additional pieces of legislation.44 Generally, oil and gas resources on public lands
that have not been specifically reserved to the federal government are "vested in
the Crown in the right of the province concerned, and are subject to provincial
legislative and executive action." 45 As the owner of oil and gas resources, the prov-
ince has the same rights as any other private property owner, and is subject to the
same restrictions on private ownership imposed by common law or legislation. 46
1. Legislative Authoriy of the Provinces Derived From the BNA Act. A province is em-
powered to make laws relating to "the Management and Sale of the Public Lands
belonging to the Province."'47 It would appear that oil and gas resources are in-
cluded within the scope of this action.48 Although the exact meaning of "manage-
38. Ballem, Energy Crunch, supra note 14, at 746; Ballem, 0 and Gas, supra note 14, at 261.
39. Ballem, Energy Crunch, supra note 14, at 261.
40. Such a declaration, however, would almost certainly include not only the physical structure of the
oil and gas facilities, but also the activities carried on in these facilities. See, e.g. The Queen v. Thumlert,
20 D.L.R. 2d 335 (1960); Montreal v. Montreal Street R. Co., [1922] A.C. 33.
41. Ballem, Energy Crunch, supra note 14, at 261.
42. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 88.
43. Id. at 92. Public ownership of onshore oil and gas rights in Ontario, Quebec and the eastern
provinces is insubstantial, while in the western provinces most of the oil and gas rights are publicly owned.
For example, in British Columbia 90 percent of the mineral rights in the Peace River Block are publicly
owned, while in Alberta and Saskatchewan 80 percent of the minerals are on public lands. Id at 92.
44. The distribution for Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec is set forth in the BNA
Act at §§ 108, 109, and 117. Public land was similarly donated in British Columbia when it was added to
Canada in 1871. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 90. In the prairie provinces, however, public property rights
were not allocated until 1930, British North America Act, 1930, 21 Geo. 5, c. 26 (Imp.).
45. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 91.
46. Id at 93. The provinces are not restricted by the division of legislative authority set forth in §§ 91
and 92 of the BNA Act. Id. at 95. In Smylie v. The Queen, 27 Ont. App. 172 (1900), Associate Justice
Moss explained this aspect of publicly owned property in dicta. "I see no reason for thinking that the
legislature may not, in respect of his property, viz., attach to the contract a condition not impossible of
performance, or unlawful per se, or prohibited by an existing law."
47. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 92(5).
48. See generally, Crommelin, supra note 26, at 101-02. Eg., in Burrard, Power Co., v. The King,
[1911] A.C. 87 (P.C.)(Can.), "public lands" were held to include "the water rights incidental to those
lands." In addition, the Fisheries case, Attorney Gen. of Canada v. Attorney Gen. of Ont. [1898] A.C. 700
(P.C.)(Can.), held that "public lands" in § 92 (5) include fishing rights.
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ment and sale" is uncertain, 49 under this clause, the provincial government is free
to choose methods of exploration for 5 0 and to regulate production of 51 Crown oil
and gas. Legislation imposing royalties on oil and gas is also within provincial
authority as part of the "management and sale of public lands. '52 Once title to
property has passed from the province, however, this section no longer provides a
basis for legislative authority over the property. 53 Furthermore, management of
public lands may effect interprovincial trade and thus conflict with the federal
government's trade and commerce power.54
Section 92(3) of the BNA Act gives the provincial legislatures authority to levy
taxes within a province. 55 This authority, however, is limited to direct taxation. 56
Furthermore, the provincial taxing authority is restricted to matters within "the
raising of a revenue for provincial purposes."'57
The limitations of "raising revenue for provincial purposes" were examined in
Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil, Ltd v. Government of Saskatchewan. 58 In 1973, the Sas-
katchewan legislature passed the Oil and Gas Conservation, Stabilization, and De-
velopment Act, 59 designed to divert some of the enhanced value of Saskatchewan
49. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 102-06. There is a line of cases holding that federal legislation
which is otherwise valid will not be struck down merely because the subject matter of the legislation is
provincial property. See, e.g., The Queen v. Robertson, 6 Can. S. Ct. 52 (1882) (fisheries); Attorney Gen. of
B.C. v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [1914] A.C. 153 (P.C.) (Can.) (fisheries); Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold,
[19031 A.C. 73 (P.C.)(Can.) (mining rights); Attorney Gen. of Canada v. Ontario, [1898] A.C. 700 (P.C.)
(Can.) (fisheries); Cushing v. Dupuy, 5 App. Cas. 409 (P.C. 1880) (Can.) (fisheries).
50. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 122.
51. Id. at 123.
52. Id at 118.
53. Many provincial legislatures have used this section as a basis for regulating prices of oil and gas,
however.
54. The only case in which the relationship between "the management and sale of the public lands
belonging to the province" and "the regulation of trade and commerce" was directly at issue was Smylie v.
The Queen, 27 Ont. App. 172 (1900). A provincial statute requiring crown timber licenses to include a
restrictive condition was upheld as an exercise of provincial legislative authority under the management
and sale clause even though the condition might affect trade and commerce. Thus, the Smyh case gave
§ 92(5) a broader scope than did the earlier fisheries cases. As Crommelin notes, however, this case also
stands for the basic principle that the general must yield to the particular. Crommelin, supra note 26, at
106. It is probable that a provincial statute inserting conditions in sales of oil and gas rights woud be
upheld if pursuant to the management and sale of public lands. Id. at 118.
55. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 92(3). If the thing or person being taxed is within the Province, how-
ever, a tax based on some extraprovincial attributes is valid. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 110.
56. In Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C. 1887)(Can.), the Privy Council adapted
John Stuart Mill's definition of direct and indirect taxation:
Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is demanded from the very person who it
is intended or desired should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in
the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself in the expense of another; such are the
excise or customs.
Id at 582. See also Atlantic Smoke Shops, Ltd. v. Conlon and Attorney Gen. of Canada [1943] A.C. 550
(P.C.)(Can.) (direct tax imposed on final consumers of goods); Lawson v. Interior Tree, Fruit and Vegeta-
ble Committee, 2 D.L.R. 193 (1931) (indirect tax on intermediate transactions in production or distribu-
tion of goods); The King v. Caledonian Collieries, Ltd. [1928] A.C. 358 (P.C.) (Can.) (indirect tax based on
gross value of production from a mine); Nickel Rim Mines, Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. of Ont. 53 D.L.R.2d 290
(Ont. 1965), appeal dismissed, 60 D.L.R.2d 576 (1967) (direct tax on net revenue from mining).
57. BNA Act., supra note 6, § 92(2). This section has not been narrowly construed by the courts.
Crommelin, supra note 26, at 110-11.
58. 80 D.L.R.3d 449 (1978).
59. The Oil and Gas Conservation, Stabilization, and Development Act, 1973, S.S. 1973-73, c. 72,
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oil to the people of Saskatchewan.6" Canadian Industrial Gas Oil Ltd. (CIGOL)
brought an action against Saskatchewan challenging the constitutionality of the
legislation on the grounds that the legislation imposed an impermissible indirect
tax and interefered with the federal government's trade and commerce power.
The Canadian Supreme Court found the provisions creating a mineral income
tax6 land a royalty surcharge6 2 to be ultra vires the legislature.
63
In concluding that the statute was unconstitutional because it attempted to
regulate trade and commerce by fixing prices in the external market, the majority
clearly extended the scope of the federal trade and commerce power. 64 It is clear
from the CIGOL decision that a provincial government cannot impose a tax on an
export commodity if the effect of the tax is to fix a floor price for the commodity.
The decision suggests that the legislation may be held unconstitutional if it at-
tempts to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.
65
The provinces have exclusive legislative authority over "all matters of a merely
local or private Nature in the Province" 66 as well as over "Property . . . in the
Province". 6 7 Legislation regulating the exploration of private oil and gas in the
provinces is within the purview of these clauses, absent a contrary Parliamentary
declaration. 68 For example, Alberta may fix the price of gas consumed and pro-
amended S.S. 1973-74, c. 73; amendments to the Mineral Resources Act, S.S. 1973-74, c. 64; and amend-
ments to The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulations, 1969, O/C 95/74 and 1238/74.
60. Douglas, Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil, Ltd v. The Government of Saskatchewan, 43 SASK. L. REV. 177
(1978-79).
61. The tax was 100% of the difference between the price received at the well head and the basic well
head price, a statutory figure approximately equal to the price per barrel received by producers prior
to the energy crisis. The owner s interest in oil and gas rights in producing tracts of less than 1,280
acres were exempted from the tax. Deductions approved by the Minister of Mineral Resources were
allowed in respect of increases in production costs and extraordinary transporation costs. Provision
was made for the Minister to determine the well head value of the oil where he was of the opinion that
oil had been disposed of at less than its fair value.
J. Martland in CIGOL, 80 D.L.R.3d at 449, 451 (1978).
62. (A)lI petroleum and natural gas in all producing tracts within the Province were expropriated
and subjected to what was called a 'royalty surcharge'. Oil and gas rights owned by one person in
producing tracts not exceeding 1,280 acres were exempted. Although introduced by [r]egulation
rather than statute, the royalty surcharge is calculated in the same manner as the mineral income tax.
For all practical purposes they are the same, save one exception. The well-head value for the purposes
of royalty surcharge is the higher of the price received at the well-head and the price per barrel listed in
the Minister's Order.
Id at 451-52.
63. Id at 477. The majority and dissent agreed that the mineral income tax was "not an income tax
in any generally recognized sense of the term." (Dickson, J.; dissenting opinion.) In addition, the royalty
had more characteristics of a tax than of a conventional royalty, since the royalties could not be deducted
from income, but were calculated according to fair market value of production. Thus, the court held that
the taxation scheme did not constitute direct taxation within the province and was therefore outside the
scope of the provincial taxing power under § 92(2) of the BNA Act. 80 D.L.R.3d at 463.
A second ground of CIGOL's attack was that the legislation related to trade and commerce which is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament. The majority concluded that the statute did aim at the
regulation of trade and commerce, and was thus unconstitutional.
64. Douglas, supra note 60, at 188. As one author noted, ". . . the Supreme Court, in broadening the
scope of the trade and commerce power, would appear to be moving toward a more centralized view of
Canadian federalism particularly in relation to natural resources." Note, The Oil WellIncome TaxAct: 1978
43 SASK. L. REV. 125, 129 (1978-79).
65. See generally Elliott,Junz'dictional Dilemmas in Resource Industries, 17 ALTA L. REV. 91, 99-101 (1979).
66. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 92(16).
67. Id § 92(13).
68. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 123. Parliament could make a declaration regarding oil and gas
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duced in Alberta.69
Section 92(10) grants the provinces exclusive legislative authority over local
works and undertakings except those enumerated in subsections (a), (b) and (c),
which may be the subject of federal legislation under Parliament's declaratory
power. 70 For example, the interprovincial pipelines are clearly "works and under-
takings connecting the province with any other or others of the provinces, or ex-
tending beyond the limits of the province, ' 71 and are consequently subject to
federal jurisdiction.72 Conversely, feeder and gathering lines that carry oil and gas
from producing fields to consumption points within the same province are local
works and undertakings and are thus subject to provincial legialative authority. 73
II
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE DIVISION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE
GOVERNMENTS
The U.S. Constitution provides a federal system that ensures the individual
states some autonomy and, at the same time, allots the national government suffi-
cient authority to resolve issues of general concern. 74 Certain enumerated powers
are delegated to the federal government by the states; powers not so delegated are
reserved to the states. 75 The extent of the delegated powers has long been a source
production facilities under § 92(10)(c) of the BNA Act, taking the regulation of production out of provin-
cial legislative authority. For a discussion of the declaratory power of Parliament, see notes 37-41 supra and
accompanying text.
69. Ballem, Energy Crunch, supra note 14, at 754. However, where the federal Petroleum Administra-
tion Act, S.C. 1974-75, c. 47, applies Alberta may not fix the price of such gas.
70. BNA Act, supra note 6, § 92(10).
71. Id at § 92(10)(a).
72. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 128. The National Energy Board has accorded a very broad defini-
tion to pipeline:
'Pipeline' means a line for the transmission of gas or oil connecting a province with any other or others
of the provinces or extending beyond the limits of a province, and includes all branches, extensions,
tanks, reservoirs, storage facilities, pumps, racks, compressors, loading facilitities, interstation systems
of communication by telephone, telegraph, or radio, and real and personal property and works con-
nected therewith.
R.S.C. 1970, C. N-61 (as amended by R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 and c. 27 (1st Supp.), and S.C. 1973 (lst Sess.), c.
52, s. 2. The Dominion has, however, exercised its jurisdiction mainly over trunklines connecting the prov-
inces with one another. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 128.
73. Crommelin, supra note 26, at 128. For example, Alberta has placed its feeder and gathering lines
under the jurisdiction of the Energy Resources Conservation Board. Id at 128.
74. Note, Constitutional Law--The Federal Sstem--State Sovereignty as an Implied Restraint Upon the Com-
merce Power-National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 US 833 (1976), 52 WASH. L. REV. 747. One com-
mentator has noted that:
[There are] twin poles of federalism: sufficient national supremacy to preserve unity, and adequate
autonomy to prevent centralization. From these standards, other constitutional guideposts follow: an
inviolable sovereignty of the states serving to check national aggrandizement, supreme plenary enu-
merated powers dominating local concerns to serve the general interest, the insulation of "indispensa-
ble" state functions from "drastic invasions" by federal power; a national supremacy overcoming state
activities burdening by their effect national areas of power.
Salmon, The Federalist Principle." The Interaction of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air
Act, 2 COL. J. ENVIR. L. 290, 359-60 (1976).
75. The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." In
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of considerable controversy.
A. Federal Legislative Authority with Respect to Oil and Gas
1. Legislative Authority Over Federally Owned Resources. The federal government has
legislative and regulatory power to control production and exploration of federally
owned energy resources. The Constitution gives the federal government the power
"to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations" over such resources.76
Federally owned resources consist of those found under federal land 77 and those
resources reserved under privately owned land.78 This is an important power since
the federal government owns an estimated 60 percent of the crude oil and natural
gas reserves and 80 percent of the oil shale reserves in the United States. 79
2. Federal Legislative Authority Under the Commerce Clause. Much of the federal gov-
ernment's authority to regulate energy resources is implied from the commerce
clause,8 0 which gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States." The passage of oil and gas from one state to
another is clearly subject to federal legislative authority under the commerce
clause, as is the exportation of oil and gas.' The Supreme Court's interpretation
of the commerce clause since the late 1930s has broadened the scope of the clause.
Federal legislation will generally be upheld if the relationship between the regula-
tion and commerce has a rational basis.8 2
Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Commiss'on8 3 was an action brought by four
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall stated, "This govern-
ment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers."
76. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
77. Congress has virtually unlimited power to control and dispose of such land. Kleppe v. New Mex-
ico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). In the absence of Congres-
sional preemption, however, states may exercise their police power over federal lands. In Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366, (W.D.Okla. 1967), aj'dper curam, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 289 (1969), the district court stated that:
[T]he authorities treating with the matter of exclusive control of federal lands by the Federal Govern-
ment clearly and definitely hold that State law and the State police power extends over the federal
public domain unless and until Congress has determined to deal exclusively with the subject.
277 F. Supp. at 369. For a discussion of federal-state conflicts over control of public lands, See Harvey,
Federal-State Relationships in Federal Land and Resources Management, 54 DENVER L. J. 585, 593-98 (1977).
The federal government operates leasing programs with respect to much of its land, and as lessor con-
trols the terms of the leases. In 1974, the U.S. Department of Interior began a leasing program in the
Picenance Basin, where most of the federal government's oil shale reserves are located. The Picenance
Basin is located in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming. Id at 591.
78. Id at 588-89.
79. Id at 588.
80. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
81. Cf discussion of the Canadian Parliament's trade and commerce power, at notes 21-30 supra and
accompanying text.
82. Seegenerally, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-63 (1978) [herein-
after cited as NOWAK]. An activity comes under the commerce power if it has a close relationship with or
effect on commerce. Furthermore, Congress may regulate activities in a single state if the regulation is
"necessary and proper" to regulating commerce. Thus, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S.
672 (1954), the Court upheld the regulations under the Natural Gas Act that affected interstate aspects of
the natural gas industry.
83. 494 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
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gas producing states8 4 challenging the constitutionality of the Natural Gas Policy
Act (NGPA).85 The plaintiffs alleged that the NGPA exceeded the power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce, and interfered with traditional functions of
states, and was therefore impermissible by virtue of the tenth amendment.8 6 In
upholding the constitutionality of the NGPA, the district court stated that "[iut is
now beyond argument that Congress may regulate activities which are wholly in-
trastate when the intrastate activity either has substantial economic effect on inter-
state commerce or where federal regulation of the intrastate activity is necessary to
effectuate interstate regulation. 81 7 Thus, the court found that Congress "had a
rational basis for determining that the unregulated intrastate gas market affected
interstate commerce," and that "the means selected by Congress were reasonably
adapted to eliminating the burden."'8
3. The Federal Taxing Power. The Constitution expressly provides Congress with
broad powers of taxation.89 It also provides for intergovernmental immunity with
respect to taxation.90 Congress may constitutionally levy a tax that incidentally
affects a state provided the source of revenue is not uniquely the state's. 9' Since
the federal taxing power is so broad, issues that will arise with respect to taxation
in the oil and gas field will most likely concern limits on the taxing power of a
state.
B. State Taxes and the Constitution
States have a broad range of powers to regulate energy resources. Taxation is
often used by states as a means of regulating oil and gas.92  State taxes which
increase production, transportation, or selling costs may be attacked under both
the commerce and equal protection clauses.
1. State Property and Income Taxes. The states have the power to levy ad valorem
property taxes on real property as well as tangible and intangible personal prop-
84. The four states were Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana and Wyoming.
85. See note 4 supra
86. 494 F. Supp. at 653.
87. Id
88. Id at 654. The court also stated that:
• . . the Court finds the NGPA to be constitutional. This decision does not find the Act to be wise or
fair or best suited to meet the present and future economic and energy needs of the nation. But it is
fundamental that establishment of policy in these respects is the business of the elected legislative
branch-the Congress. As long as the laws enacted are within its constitutional authority the Courts
are not empowered to re-write, or veto them, or to second-guess or otherwise undo its chosen policy
despite possible errors of judgment.
Id at 662.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4-5; U.S.
CONST. Amend. XVI.
90. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576 (1946). For a general discussion of intergovernmen-
tal immunity from taxation, See NOWAK, supra note 82, at 367-70.
91. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 582.
92. Note, The Efect and Validity of State Taxation of Energv Resources, 58 WASH. U. L. Q. 345, 346 (1980).
Energy producing states have several objectives in taxing energy resources, including controlling produc-
tion, compensating for loss of state wealth and compensating for environmental damage. M. WILLRICH,
ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGES (1976).
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erty. 93 Real and tangible personal property may be taxed only in the state in
which the property is located. Intangible personal property, on the other hand,
may be taxed in both the state in which the owner lives and in any state in which
the property receives benefits and protection. 94 Once goods enter the stream of
interstate or foreign commerce, however, they become immune from state and lo-
cal taxation so long as the goods remain in the stream of commerce.
95
A state may also impose an income tax on all items of income realized by
individuals domiciled in the state. Since individuals receive personal benefits from
the state, such a tax is deemed to satisfy due process requirements. 96 Since the
state protects a nonresident's business and property, it may also impose an income
tax upon the nonresident's income produced in that state.
9 7
2. State License Fees. License fees imposed by states will generally be upheld if
there is a sufficient nexus between the taxing state and the taxable activity, and if
the tax does not unduly burden interstate commerce. 98 States levy a variety of
license fees. Fixed fee licenses will be upheld if the business subjected to the tax is
essentially local in nature. 99 License taxes based on production are generally valid
if imposed by the state where production occurs. 5t ° License taxes measured by
93. See generaly, NOWAK, supra note 82, at 282-304.
94. Thus, the requirements of substantive due process are met if the taxing jurisdiction has provided
benefits to the taxpayer or to his property. In Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940),
Justice Frankfurter writing for the Court stated that:
[The due process] ... test is whether property was taken without due process of law or, if paraphrase
we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportuni-
ties and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return. The substantial privilege of carrying on business in Wisconsin,
which has here been given, clearly supports the tax.
95. Goods are deemed to have entered the stream of commerce when the goods physically enter the
transit system. Thus, in Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886), the court sustained a state property tax
on logs being held ready for shipment. The Court stated that:
[s]uch goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the state, subject as such, to its
jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a com-
mon carrier for transportation, to another state, or have been started upon such transportation in a
continuous route or journey. We think that this must be the true rule on the subject.
Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. at 527.
96. E.g., New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) (upholding a state tax imposed on
residents on rental and interest income derived from property located outside the state); Maguire v. Trefry,
253 U.S. 12 (1920) (upholding a state tax imposed on a resident beneficiary of an out-of-state trust).
97. E.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) (upholding a state tax imposed on income derived from
property or business in the taxing state owned by nonresidents). It is important to note that states are
limited in levying taxes by not only the due process clause but also by the privileges and immunities clause.
See note text accompanying 113 infra.
In order to avoid unfair tax burdens on multistate corporations, state income tax statutes ususally
provide for allocation of certain types of income to various states. See generally, NOWAK, supra note 82, at
326-29. See also the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act §§ 4-8.
98. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (upholding Mississippi statute
assessing a privilege tax upon interstate transporation corporations).
99. Eg., California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941) (upholding a fixed fee license required for
selling transportation on public highway in the state). Cf Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887)
(invalidating a fixed fee license tax imposed on salesman who did not maintain a regular place of business
in the taxing district).
100. See Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (upholding a state tax bsed on a
certain percentage of the entire value of ore mined or produced during the year characterizing mining a a
local business).
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gross receipts and imposed by the marketplace state may be challenged on the
ground that no sufficient nexus exists between the taxable activity and the taxing
state. However, the Court has generally sustained the validity of taxes measured
by gross receipts imposed by the state of production. 10 1
3. State Taxes and Intergovernmental Immunity. Intergovernmental immunity may
operate to restrict the taxing power of states as well. Federal activities are generally
immune from state taxation, however, states are sometimes able to collect revenues
by indirect means. 10 2 For example, states may impose a tax on the removal of
minerals from lands leased from the federal government. 0 3
C. Constitutional Limits on State Authority
1. The Commerce Clause and Burdens on Interstate Commerce. While the federal govern-
ment was increasing its control over intrastate gas and promulgating complex reg-
ulations regarding oil, some states were attempting to control their energy
resources through taxation. The commerce clause can limit a state's use of the
taxing power. The crucial factor is whether the activity burdens interstate com-
merce. 1° 4 For example, Montana's severance tax on coal' 0 5 was recently upheld,
despite a challenge to its constitutionality based on the commerce clause and the
supremacy clause.1°6 Because the tax is computed at the same rate regardless of
the destination, and is calculated according to coal consumed, the Court found
101. Eg., Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (upholding a state tax on business of
producing natural gas in state computed on a basis of gross proceeds); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250
U.S. 459 (1919) (upholding a city gross receipts tax imposed on every manufacturer doing business in the
city). See generally, Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard
Pressed Steel and Colomal Pipelne, 62 VA. L. REV. 149 (1976). Gross receipts taxes imposed on interstate
activities must specify a taxable subject of activity, such as manufacturing. A tax imposed on gross receipts
from all trades or businesses will be invalidated as a burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., J.D. Adams
Mfg. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (invalidating a general gross receipts tax as applied to a firm engaged
in interstate commerce).
102. Carver, Intergovermental Relations and Energy Taxation, 58 DENVER L. J. 141, 143 (1980). The Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, for example, is expressly exempt from state taxes, but it can make payments in
lieu of taxes on its facilities. 16 U.S.C. § 8311 (1976).
103. Eg., Montana Coal Severance Tax, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -111 (1979). The
validity of this tax was recently upheld by the Supreme Court. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 49
U.S.L.W. 4957 (1981). See notes 105-107 i'nfa and accompanying text.
104. Cases upholding regulations include Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers v. Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pac. R. R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968), reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1045 (upholding state law
requiring full train crews); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (upholding
state order requiring company to take natural gas at fixed prices although 90 percent of gas went out of
state); Gorum v. Okla. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Bd., 235 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Okla. 1964) (upholding state
prohibition on nonresidents storing or dispensing gas).
Regulations were invalidated in FPC v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 362 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Okla. 1973),
afd, 415 U.S. 961 (1974) (invalidating state orders fixing minimum well-head prices on natural gas from
wells that moves in intra- and interstate commerce). In Sarge v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 524 (1912), the Court
stated that "the State cannot, under cover of executing its police powers undertake what amounts essen-
tially to a regulation of interstate commerce, or impose a direct burden upon that commerce." See also,
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964) (invalidating state regulation which
would have barred interstate milk from a large part of the Florida milk market); Southern Pac. v. Arizona
ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating state law regulating length of interstate trains).
105. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to 111 (1979).
106. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 49 U.S.L.W. 4957 (1981).
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that the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce. 10 7
On the other hand, in Mayland v. Louisiana, 108 the commerce clause limited the
state's taxing power. Louisiana was found to lack sovereignty over much of its
offshore property, which is rich in oil and gas. 10 9 While Louisiana producers must
pay a severance tax on natural gas, Louisiana could not tax offshore producers of
natural gas. This created an economic disparity, to which Louisiana responded by
enacting a tax on the first use of gas in the state.' 10 The Court found the tax
unconstitutional on the ground that it impermissibly discriminated against inter-
state commerce. I"'
2. The Priv'leges and Immunities Clause and Interstate Comity. The "privileges and
immunities" clause in article IV of the Constitution is sometimes known as the
comity clause 1 2 since its purpose is to ensure comity and courtesy among the
states. Although this clause has been sparingly applied by the Court, at times it
has been invoked with respect to natural resources and state and local taxation. 13
The few cases actually decided under the privileges and immunities clause dealing
with natural resources and wildlife reject the theory of state ownership of such
resources."t 4 These cases seem to stand for the proposition that a state has govern-
mental power to regulate the exploitation of resources so long as the regulations do
not discriminate against out-of-state residents.
In Hckihn v. Orbeck, 115 an Alaskan statute known as "Alaska Hire" ' 1 6 was chal-
lenged as violating the privileges and immunities clause by a group of nonresidents
seeking jobs in the Alaskan resource industry. The Supreme Court held that the
Alaska Hire was unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities clause, since
the State made no showing that the nonresidents were a "peculiar source of evil"
which Alaska Hire was intended to remedy, that is, Alaska's high unemploy-
107. 49 U.S.L.W. 4960. Under the test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 279 (1977), a state tax does not offend the commerce clause if it "is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state." However the state court in Dayton
Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 391 N.E. 2d 716 (1979), declared a severance tax on coal
mined in Ohio to be unconstitutional. The tax favored sulphur-rich Ohio coal by imposing a lower tax
rate on high sulphur coal, and thus constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
108. 49 U.S.L.W. 4562 (1981). See generall, Morgan and Olson, Nonneutral Features of Energy Taxation,
20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 853 (1980); Comment, The Loutiana First-Use Tax. Does It Violate the Commerce Clause
53 TULANE L. REV. 1474 (1979); Note, The Efect and Vahdiy of State Taxation of Energy Resources, 58 WASH.
U. L. Q. 345 (1980); Note, First Use Tax, 31 LA. COASTAL L. REP. 1 (1978).
109. Comment, The Louiiana First-Use Tax, supra note 108, at 1474-80.
110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 47; 1301(A) (West Supp. 1980).
111. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4566.
112. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. This clause provides that "the Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." See generaly, NOWAK, supra note
82, at 275-79.
113. For a discussion of state taxation, see notes 92-111 supra and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (invalidating a state law requiring license fees to
be paid by nonresidents at a much higher rate than by residents).
115. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
116. ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.40.010 to .090 (1977). The key provision of "Alaska Hire" required that
"all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes, unitization agree-
ments, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the state is a party" must contain a provision
that "qualified Alaska residents" be hired in preference to nonresidents.
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3. The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption of State Regulation. The supremacy
clause 1 8 operates to preempt state legislation where there is actual conflict be-
tween the state and federal laws." 9 Because of the broad federal regulatory
schemes dealing with energy that have been enacted by Congress, the supremacy
clause is a powerful tool for challenging state legislation in the field of energy. 20
The Court has recently adopted a strict interpretation of conflict and will in-
validate state legislation only where there is clear evidence of congressional intent
to preempt state regulation. ' 2 ' Nonetheless, the supremacy clause and the doctrine
of federal preemption continue to be a significant restraint on state regulation of
oil and gas.
In Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead 122 the Court invalidated a New Mexico tax
on energy. The tax applied to all utility companies generating electricity within
the state. For electricity sold at retail within New Mexico, this tax could be
credited against the New Mexico gross receipts tax, but where the electricity was
sold in other states, no such credit was available. Because the tax discriminated
against out-of-state consumers, the Court found that the tax violated a federal
statute prohibiting such discrimination, and invalidated the tax under the
supremacy clause.' 23
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tu'y 124 a federal district court held that a New York stat-
ute, 125 imposing a gross receipts tax on oil companies while not allowing them to
"pass" the tax on in increased sales prices was preempted by the Emergency Petro-
leum Allocation Act 126 and the Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations. 2 7 The
state statute was therefore held invalid under the supremacy clause.
117. 437 U.S. at 526. The Court continued that even if the State's showing was accepted as sufficient
to indicate that nonresidents were a "peculiar source of evil," the statute still did not pass constitutional
muster, since "the discrimination the Act works against nonresidents does not bear a substantial relation-
ship to the particular 'evil' they are said to present." Id. at 527.
118. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
119. See generall, NOWAK, supra note 82, at 267-70.
120. See, e.g., FPC v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 362 F. Supp. 522, 535-41 (W.D. Okla. 1973), afd, 415
U.S. 961 (1974) (invalidating state regulations fixing minimum well-head prices of natural gas on grounds
that the regulations conflict with rates fixed by the FPC under the Natural Gas Act); Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 349 U.S. 44 (1955) per cunum (invalidating state regulations fixing mini-
mum price for natural gas after production and gathering has ended on grounds that such sales are to be
regulated exclusively by the FPC).
121. In New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973), the Court held
that despite the similarity of the provisions, the New York Work Rules were not preempted by the 1967
amendments to the Social Security Act, specifically the Work Incentive Program. Justice Powell quoted
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203-03: "If Congress is authorized to act in a field it should manifest its
intention clearly. . . [t]he exercise of Federal supremacy is not likely to be presumed.
122. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
123. The Tax Reform Act of 1979 included a provision prohibiting discriminatory state taxes on
electricity. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1979).
124. 499 F. Supp. 888 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
125. N.Y. Tax Law § 182(12)(a) (McKinney 1980).
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976).
127. 10 C.F.R. § 212.81-85 (1981).
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III
CONCLUSION
With the battle lines drawn and the constitutional arenas defined, some obser-
vations regarding the positions of the opponents in each country are possible. An
important basic difference between the U.S. Constitution and the Canadian Con-
stitution is the provision for local authority. While the provinces have certain ex-
plicitly enumerated powers, states have a general reservation of all powers not
specifically delegated to the federal government. While in theory this may give
states greater flexibility than provinces in attempting to assert control over natural
resources, it deprives them of a "bottom line" with which to resist ever-broadening
interpretations of the federal government's enumerated powers.
On the other hand, although provinces have the advantage of certain affirma-
tive powers, they must, when asserting control over resources, satisfy the dual bur-
den of showing not only that the action taken is outside federal authority, but also
that the action is an authorized exercise of provincial authority. Thus, the tactics
they employ must be more finely tuned than state tactics.
Whether one constitutional system or the other is ultimately more favorable to
either local or national government remains to be seen. Because there are so many
factors at work beyond the broad legal confines of the debate, constitutional con-
siderations may not be the most influential in shaping any final resolution. What
is assured, however, is that the struggle for control over natural resources is far
from being resolved. In both Canada and the United States, the federal govern-
ment has been expanding its control over natural resources to include matters tra-
ditionally considered to be exclusively local in nature. This expansion has set the
stage for continued confrontation in both nations as to the ultimate distribution of
governmental authority over natural resources.
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